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Comment Carmen M. Reinhart 
University of Maryland, NBER, and CEPR 
 
Motivated by the severe Asian crisis of 1997, this paper makes a fine contribution 
to the growing literature that analyzes the symptoms of a country's 
vulnerability to currency crises. While the sample of countries covered 
in the empirical analysis encompasses diverse regions, the discussion 
in the paper focuses primarily on the Asian crisis. In particular, the authors 
stress, as they have in their earlier papers, the key role played by 
weak fundamentals in undermining several of the Asian currencies. Financial 
sector fundamentals (as in Kaminsky and Reinhart 1999) play an 
important role, but the authors also devote considerable attention to the 
countries' capacity to back their "implicit" contingent liabilities, particularly 
those of the local banking sector (as in Calvo and Mendoza 1996). 
Furthermore, the analysis by Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (CPR) examines 
the links between crisis vulnerability and the productivity of investment 
projects-an important issue, particularly in several of the 
high-investment Asian countries-that have been largely ignored in this 
literature. 1  
By focusing on these fundamentals as well as on external imbalances, 
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CPR dismiss a relatively popular explanation of the Asian crisis stressing 
a liquidity crisis/financial panic story that arises out of self-fulfilling expectations, 
runs on the banks, and the currency, and that downplays the role 
of economic fundamentals. Since I happen to concur with most (although 
not all) of the points made by the authors about the proximate causes 
of the Asian crisis, I confine my remarks to two areas: First, I focus on 
issues regarding ways of strengthening the empirical analysis developed 
in this paper; second, I dwell on some of the features of the antecedents 
of the Asian crisis that merit attention and are not addressed by the authors. 
In the spirit of Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996), the empirical analysis 
employs a cross-section of countries to examine which variables help explain 
the extent of depreciation and reserve losses (i.e., a severity index) 
during the December 1996~97 period.  
The authors focus primarily on three indicators: the interaction between credit 
growth and nonperforming loans, to capture the fragility of the banking sector; the 
interaction between real exchange rate overvaluations and current account imbalances; 
and the ratio of various monetary aggregates to central bank foreign exchange 
reserves, to assess the central bank's capacity to back its contingent 
liabilities. In addition, the authors include the incremental capital-to-output 
ratio (ICOR) and its interaction with credit growth. The idea is that  
during lending booms, funds are allocated to increasingly less-productive 
projects. CPR also experiment with two types of dummy variables that allow 
for the interaction among the indicators described above. For instance, 
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the current account/real exchange rate variable is allowed to enter directly 
as well as through an interaction dummy that takes on the value of I when 
the money-to-reserves ratio is in the upper three quartiles. 
Both the selection of the variables and the way they are allowed to interact 
are intuitively appealing and well grounded in theory. I do have, 
however, some practical reservations about the information content of nonperforming 
loans for two reasons. First, banks often engage in the "evergreening" 
of problem loans for extended periods-as a consequence, nonperforming 
loans often lag rather than lead the crisis and the authors use 
1996 data for nonperforming loans. Secondly, the criteria applied to classify 
a loan as nonperforming is highly heterogeneous across countries, 
particularly in emerging markets. My hunch is that most of the information 
content of this composite term is coming from the lending boom 
rather than from non performing loans. 
As to the estimation strategy, my main criticism has to do with the interaction 
terms introduced through the two dummy variables. While sympathetic 
to the economic rationale for wanting to include these additional 
terms in the regression, I find that they introduce serious collinearity problems. 
The presence of collinearity is evident in the large standard errors 
reported for most coefficients in tables 1.2-1.5. Most of these terms are 
not individually statistically significant; the failure to reject the null hypothesis 
that the sum of several pairs of coefficients (the Wald tests reported 
at the bottom of tables 1.2-1.5) comes from the actual variable 
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rather than from the secondary interaction term. The absence of the incremental 
explanatory power of these interaction dummies is also evident in 
the reported adjusted R2, which, in the majority of cases, does not increase 
by much and in some cases actually declines. The introduction of these 
additional terms also chews up precious degrees of freedom, which in some 
of the regressions is as low as seventeen. 2 
Apart from the collinearity problem, the results accord well with the 
priors. External imbalances increase the severity of the currency crisis as 
does booming credit. The interaction terms, although not statistically significant 
in almost all cases, also have the anticipated signs. 
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A second criticism of the paper, albeit one which is easy to remedy, is 
that the authors downplay some very interesting results on the interaction 
between the reOR and lending booms and its role in explaining who is 
vulnerable to this kind of crisis. 3 As noted earlier, measures of the productivity 
of new investment projects have been largely overlooked in this literature. 
This is a particularly important issue for understanding why the size 
of the current account may matter-irrespective of whether it arises out 
of a low saving rate or a high investment rate.4 In the aftermath of the 
Mexican crisis, the "received wisdom" of the day was that Mexico's large 
current account deficit was a problem because it was largely owing to a 
consumption boom. At the time, there was little concern that Thailand's 
and Malaysia's large deficits would be problems since-the argument 
went-the capital inflows were financing record levels of investment. After 
Asia's crisis it becomes evident that unproductive investments are indistinguishable 
from consumption, as far as vulnerability is concerned. 
Turning to the interpretation of the events and developments to the Asian crisis 
offered in this paper, I agree with CPR that the Asian crises had their roots in a fragile 
financial sector and that this vulnerability was manifest well before the crisis erupted. 5 
As in so many banking crises, the problems first arose in the asset side of the bank 
balance sheet. Hence, in the discussion that follows, I will focus mainly on filling some 
holes in this paper's telling of the proximate causes of the Asian crisis. CPR mention 
that the liberalization of the capital account and the financial sector was 
an important factor in explaining the surge in banks' offshore borrowing 
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in the years before the crisis; I would like to mention two additional factors 
that drove banks in these countries to become ever more dependent on 
offshore borrowing. 
First, while fiscal policy mistakes are usually easy to spot, mistakes in 
monetary and exchange rate policies are more difficult to single out unless 
these produce high inflation. During the capital-inflow phase of the 
cycle, the most common policy response in the region to the surge in capital 
inflows was sterilized intervention. Yet, as shown in Montiel and Reinhart 
(1999), sterilized intervention appears to be a powerful tool in influencing 
both the volume and the composition of capital inflows, although 
hardly in the way that policy makers had originally intended it to. By providing 
a combination of an implicit exchange rate guarantee and high 
domestic interest rates on short-term assets vis-à-vis comparable international 
interest rates, sterilization policies are a magnet in attracting short-term 
flows. These policies are capable of increasing the volume of the flows 
and skewing their composition away from FDI to short maturities components. 
Second, "push" factors were also important in explaining why banks 
in the region became so dependent on short-term offshore borrowing. In 
particular, the protracted economic slump in Japan had dried up domestic 
loan demand and Japanese banks were all too eager to lend increasing 
amounts to the rapidly growing, capital-importing emerging Asian economies. Indeed, 
Japan and emerging Asia in the 1990s appear in many ways to have replayed the roles of 
U.S. banks and Latin America in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
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To sum up, this is an interesting paper which helps us understand the 
traumatic events of 1997 and 1998 in several Asian economies. Furthermore, 
the analysis is sufficiently general to provide insights into the more 
generalized features of financial vulnerability. 
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Endnotes 
 
1. CPR is not to be confused with the other CPR-Center for Policy Researtch. 
2. Twenty-four observations and seven coefficients to estimate (see Table 1.3). 
3. The discussion is limited to a couple of paragraphs. 
4. For a different interpretation of why the current account matters in explaining the 
severity of crises, see Calvo and Reinhart (2000). 
5. This pattern of interaction between currency and banking crises is not unique to 
the Asian cases; see Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). 
 
